Off-the-Record Messaging (OTR) is an online analogy of face-to-face private chat -messages are confidential and authenticated at the time of the conversation, but cannot later be used to prove authorship. The original OTR protocol is limited to two parties, and is extended by multi-party OTR (mpOTR) to the group chat setting. In doing this, mpOTR unintentionally weakens the security properties provided by its two-party predecessor. We propose an improved group OTR (GOTR) protocol that provides unconditional repudiability, and show how to obtain data origin authentication given this level of repudiability.
INTRODUCTION
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is bootstrapped using Alice's and Bob's long-term asymmetric keys, authenticating Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice, but the conversation itself is secured using symmetric cryptography, and thus repudiable in the sense that given a protocol transcript recorded by either Alice, Bob, or a 3rd party observer, no one, including Alice or Bob, can prove who authored a particular message in the transcript.
Unfortunately, it is nontrivial to extend two-party OTR to a group setting. Most notably, unlike pairwise OTR, group chat users need a way to know the identity of the sender amongst group members, namely the data origin authentication problem, but adding this feature may in turn break users' repudiability. Besides, membership management, colluding malicious parties, and network partitioning are problems specific to the group setting.
Goldberg et al. proposed a multi-party OTR protocol (mpOTR) which provides repudiation by using two-party deniable entity authentication, while keeping chat messages non-repudiable among group members during protocol execution [10] . A user Alice generates an ephemeral signature key pair, which is used only in the current session for Alice to sign her messages. To provide repudiation, users exchange ephemeral public signature keys in a deniable fashion, which is achieved by by using a two-party deniable authenticated key exchange (AKE) in the protocol setup. Deniable AKE convinces two parties of each other's identity during the protocol execution, but does not allow either party to convince anyone else that authentication was successful, and therefore provides repudiability.
However, mpOTR provides repudiability properties which are weaker than the two-party version. First, deniable authentication has many partially conflicting definitions which differ in subtle but important ways [1, 5, 6, 8, 9] . One of the more important distinctions is between online and offline judges. A judge is a third party who determines whether a given user has authenticated some message, including key exchange parameters. Online judges are allowed to interact with insider adversaries during the protocol execution, while offline judges can only interact afterward. This is conceptually similar to proving something in real time, versus after the fact using an historical transcript. Second, an mpOTR transcript links all messages together, so if a user, e.g. during an interrogation, shows her knowledge of any secret contained in the conversation, she cannot deny that she has participated in the protocol run, and therefore cannot repudiate the authorship of any messages she sent, even if the protocol ensures plausible deniability. Third, to forge an mpOTR transcript, a subgroup of participants must collude. While not a problem if any single party is able to forge the transcript alone, in the multiparty setting it may be possible to show that two groups of mpOTR users act independently, or are unlikely to have colluded, severely hampering real-world plausible deniability.
We propose a group OTR (GOTR) protocol which enhances both real-world and protocol-level repudiability of group chats. GOTR achieves the same level of repudiability as that achieved using shared group keys (i.e. informationtheoretic repudiability), while still preventing malicious insiders from forging a message in the name of an honest user. GOTR utilizes a special feature of some group key agreement (GKA) protocols to turn a GKA into a robust "hotplug" GKA, and to further turn the adverse facts that the network may fail and users may be faulty into the security of the senders. Furthermore, the repudiability properties of GOTR do not rely on deniability of entity authentication algorithms. Most operations, such as key update, run symmetrically and simultaneously for each group member, and require a constant number of communication rounds. The protocol is also flexible in membership management and is resilient to membership churn. We instantiate our protocol using the Burmester-Desmedt (BD) GKA [3] and benchmark a proof-of-concept implementation of the protocol core as a plugin for Pidgin. 
GROUP OTR PROTOCOL
In this section we give descriptions of each subroutine of GOTR. We evaluate the efficiency and security properties of GOTR in the next section.
The GOTR protocol consists of the following subprotocols:
• Setup: In the setup protocol, a new user joins the group, establishes authenticated, private channels with every other user, and obtains a cryptographic digest of the conversation so far.
• KeyUpdate: Each user Ui runs a group key agreement protocol with all other users to obtain a symmetric circle key that every user knows, but only Ui will use to encrypt and authenticate messages. The information exchanged in this protocol will allow users to deduce the owner of Ui's circle key.
• SendMsg: When Ui has a message m to send, she uses her circle key to encrypt and authenticate the message, along with the chat digest, before sending the ciphertext to the group. After sending, Ui updates her digest.
• RecvMsg: When receiving a ciphertext c, Uj deduces the appropriate circle key from the presence of messages sent on private channels in KeyUpdate; the message is decrypted and integrity checked using this circle key. Uj provisionally updates his digest with the ciphertext c. The content of the message is not authenticated until the consistency check.
• ConsCheck: After receiving a ciphertext, each user exchanges digests with every user over private channels. If all members have the same digest, the message is considered to be authenticated. Since a failed consistency check could also be caused by network failure or an insider attack on chat consistency, and a sender 1 Source code available from http://www.cis.ksu.edu/~hongl/gotr/ could choose to include a forged message in her digest, plausible repudiability is maintained while allowing each user to detect forgeries using her circle key.
We note that no special procedure is needed to leave the group: when a user does not respond to KeyUpdate requests, she is assumed to have left the chat; the "hot-plug" nature of the KeyUpdate protocol allows automated recovery from such membership changes. If this situation results from a temporary network failure, the user can always re-join the group by running Setup again.
Primitives
We assume the existence of an anonymous point-to-point network between users. We also assume the existence of the following cryptographic primitives:
• r ← Zq: generates a random value in Zq.
• SecSend(i, j, m), m ← SecRecv(i, j): arbitrary twoparty secure communication primitives that provide confidential and mutually authenticated message transmission between Ui and Uj over a point-to-point network. They can be implemented by using users' longterm asymmetric keys, mutually authenticated SSL/TLS, HMQV [13] , or KEIA [8] . The algorithm does not have to be repudiable, deniable, or forward-secret.
• Σ = (Gen, EncM ac, Dec): a CCA-CMA secure [7] private-key message transmission scheme.
• (k1, k2) ← KDF (κ): a Key Derivation Function which generates random keys (k1, k2) for encryption Enc and authentication M ac respectively.
Setup
The setup stage begins after a user Ui joins the chat. Ui first obtains the common parameters of the chat, including a unique session ID sid, membership set pid, and global cryptographic parameters. We assume that these parameters are obtained from another application protocol and are shared by all group members. Ui then performs mutual entity authentication with every other user and establishes end-to-end secure communication channels.
Key Update
In key update, Ui refreshes the keys which will be used to protect her messages in the communication stage, by performing a "hotplug" GKA. Key update is invoked asynchronously by any user. The GKA is hotplug, in the sense that a party participating in the GKA can dynamically add or remove parties from the GKA without the need to recommunicate. For example, we can turn the BurmesterDesmedt GKA (BD GKA) [3] into a hotplug GKA.
To avoid ambiguity, we call each entity that participates in the BD GKA a "node". The BD GKA assumes a broadcast channel (a requirement we later relax). Nodes D = {D1, . . . , Dn} negotiate a key κ in three steps:
1. ∀D l ∈ D, D l generates a secret key r l ∈ Zq, computes and broadcasts the public key:
where p is a prime, and the subgroup g in Z * p is of prime order q and satisfies the decisional DiffieHellman assumption. the bold dashed line compose U1's circle key. Each virtual node is labeled (ijl), l ∈ {0, 1}, which denotes the virtual node D ijl that is generated by Ui to talk with Uj .
Every D l computes and broadcasts
where the indices are taken in a cycle. 3. Every D l obtains the same key
In the following text we will sometimes refer to the public keys computed from equation 1 as "z values", and the values computed from equation 2 as "X values". The GKA is proved secure (κ is indistinguishable from a random session key) against a computationally-bounded eavesdropper with transcripts of polynomially-many executions of the GKA [4, 11] .
We observe that BD has the following special properties:
• It is symmetric, in the sense that every node performs the same operations; • The group key is derived from the data that every node provides; • Contributory data {z l , X l } provided by any node D l only depends on a constant number of nodes (i.e. two).
We rely on these properties to obtain a hotplug GKA, so that the GKA can be performed over a point-to-point network. We ask every user Ui to act as two "virtual nodes" (Dij0 and Dij1) when performing contributory data exchange with user Uj , i.e. Dij0 and Dij1 will talk to Dji0 and Dji1 as shown in Figure 1 . We will use the subscript ijl, l ∈ {0, 1} to denote a value associated with the virtual node D ijl . We will denote (aij0, aij1) as aij and {aij |∀Uj ∈ pid \ {Ui}} as ai for short.
First Ui generates rij and sends zij = (g r ij0 , g r ij1 ) to Uj . In response, Uj sends zji to Ui, and Ui stores them in yij = zji. To obtain a group key, the X values must connect D into a circle. X l relies on its own secret key r l , and its two neighboring nodes' public keys.
To allow Uj to obtain Uj's BD keys, Ui computes the X values for the triples (Dji0, Dij0, Dij1) and (Dij0, Dij1, Dji1), respectively:
Ui then sends Rij to Uj . Uj does the same for Ui, and Ui stores Uj's R values in Vij = Rji. At this point, Ui and Uj have exchanged all the contributory data needed to compute the BD key for a group of four virtual nodes. We call this four-node group a "flake". In Figure 1 , the flake that is formed by user U1 and U4, denoted as f lake14, is composed of the virtual nodes (D140 → D410 → D411 → D141 → D140). Following the BD algorithm in equation (3), the group key for f lakeij , called a "flake key", can be computed as follows:
Then Ui, Uj verify that they compute the same key κij = κji with (z, y, R, V ) bound with their identities and the session, as shown in Algorithm 1. This also ensures that both parties transmitted the correct {z, X} pairs. Because the BD GKA is secure in the presence of eavesdroppers with a history transcript, if Ui replays the {z, X} pairs from another user, or provides incorrect data to Uj , she cannot obtain a shared key with Uj. As an optimization, instead of using a digital signature, the flake key κij can then be used to secure the end-to-end channel between Ui and Uj . Now Ui has obtained (N − 1) disjoint flakes. She proceeds to re-compute the X values for Dij0 and Dij1 to connect the flakes. To do so, Ui computes Wij, ∀Uj ∈ pid \ {Ui}, which are the X values of the triples (D i(j−1)1 , Dij0, Dji0) and (Dji1, Dij1, D i(j+1)0 ), using ri, zi, and yi:
Note that Ui computes Wi by herself without communicating with other users. The indices and the order do not matter (as long as the computation follows one direction; we can change the direction of an X value by inverting it). Using any element in ri and the corresponding element in zi, together with Wi and Vi, Ui is able to compute her BD key Ki, which is the BD group key of 4(N − 1) virtual nodes. For the group of users {U1, . . . , U6} in Figure 1 , U1 obtains a circle of virtual nodes (D140 (3), U1 can use z131, r140, W140, V140, V141, W141, W150, V150, . . ., W130, V130, V131, to compute the BD key of 4 · (6 − 1) virtual nodes:
Alternatively, U1 can use z161, r120, W120, . . ., V161, or other (z, r, W, V ) combinations to compute K1.
The above operation is the same for everybody. In all, N different group keys will be generated, one for each user. In order to differentiate them from the group key in its conventional notion, we call them "circle keys". Up to now, every user obtains a unique circle key that is negotiated by the entire group, but does not know other users' circle keys since Wi is essential to connect the circle, but is computed by Ui alone. To obtain unconditional repudiability, every user should know (zi, yi, Wi, Vi) (called zyW V for short). We therefore ask every user to "broadcast" zyW V . Upon Data: ∀Ui ∈ pid, sid, g, p, q Result: ri, zi, yi, Ri, Vi, κi, Wi, Ki Keyupdate(i, g, p, q) begin for ∀Uj ∈ pid \ {Ui} do /* this is performed concurrently */ r
for ∀Uj ∈ pid \ {Ui} do compute Wij if message to send then for ∀Uj ∈ pid \ {Ui} do SecSend(i,j, sid|zi|yi|Wi|Vi) compute Ki else for ∀Uj ∈ pid \ {Ui} do randomize elements z
Algorithm 1: Keyupdate: refresh the circle key receiving Ui's zyW V , any Uj can compute Ui's BD key Ki, using the private part r jil , l ∈ {0, 1} of z jil ∈ yi.
If Ui fails to talk to any Uj in above steps, she will not obtain the data of Dji0 and Dji1, but since she controls 2(N − 1) virtual nodes within the circle, she can arrange the circle as she wishes by changing the neighbors of her virtual nodes. This allows Ui to do the "hotplugging" trick: the {z, X} pairs that any Uj provided can be safely removed or replaced, and everybody except Uj is still able to compute the same key with Ui. Specifically, to remove Uj from the circle, Ui removes {Dij0, Dji0, Dji1, Dij1} altogether from the circle and computes the X values for D i(j−1)1 and D i(j+1)0 using the triples (
) respectively. A valid but different circle key will be generated without affecting other users. In a similar way, Ui can replaces Uj 's data, and can also insert an arbitrary number of virtual nodes into her circle to generate a different key.
Hotplugging provides robustness against insider attacks and network failure. In addition, since every user acts as different virtual nodes when talking to different users, data origin authentication is possible. This feature also enables an optimization to enhance robustness against inside forgers of limited power. If Ui modifies zyW V by removing the neighbors of Dij0 and Dij1 and re-computing the corresponding W values, then Uj will not be able to compute Ui's circle key. We therefore ask Ui to compute and send the real zyW V only if she is going to send a message before her next key update. Otherwise she removes or replaces the {z, X} values from some Uj = U k , re-computes the corresponding W values, and sends the modified copy of zyW V to U k . Because the circle key is hotplug, the modified zyW V is still legitimate. U k cannot tell if the {z, X} pairs are real or not, but if U k sends Uj the modified zyW V with a message encrypted with the BD key derived from them, Uj will not be able to compute a key and read the message. This prevents inside forgers who act individually and do not control message delivery, like average end-users, from abusing Ui's circle key. Note that ultimately we prevent forgery by any inside forgers through conversation consistency checks. This optimization enhances robustness by defending less powerful forgers from easily disrupting the protocol execution, but is not required to achieve the desired security properties.
In practice, when a human user is typing, the GOTR client knows that she is planning to send a message, and will invoke a key update if the key is old enough. Message sending may be slightly delayed in order to use the new key.
Communication: SendMsg, RecvMsg, ConsCheck
Ui uses the keys derived from her circle key to encrypt and authenticate messages. All the {z, X} pairs needed to compute the circle key (i.e. zyW V ) piggyback on the message, together with the digest (as a consistency check) of the chat log up to but not including this message. We emphasize that the digest of the chat log is performed over the chat message ciphertext (without decryption and with the {z, X} pairs) from Ui's view of the chat. In particular, the chat log does not include data transmitted in other operations such as key update. The whole message is then sent directly to the underlying (anonymous) messaging service, or to each user one by one over an anonymous network.
Specifically, Ui's message is in the following format:
where sid is the session id, Op is a marker indicating that the message is a chat message, and clen is the number of {z, X} pairs that follow. It is also the number of exponentiations needed to compute the key. K is a BD key computed from the {z, X} pairs, together with the private part of one element in {zi|i = 1, . . . , clen}, which is exactly the honest sender Ui's zyW V , and K is her circle key. k1, k2 are derived by feeding a Key Derivation Function with K, and are used for encryption Enc and authentication M ac respectively. digest is the sender's view of the chat log digest. The Mac tag is computed over the entire message, starting from the sid field through the end of the ciphertext. This design is multipurpose. First, piggybacking {z, X} pairs on the message does not break the secrecy of the key. Second, it guarantees that all receivers who contributed to Ui's circle key can decrypt the message and verify its integrity, regardless of whether they have received the previously "broadcast" data or not. Third, receivers rely on the {z, X} pairs to determine the message origin (explained below). Fourth, the piggybacking {z, X} pairs provides some robustness against DoS attacks, without the need to verify the M ac. Fifth, the digest provides a convenient way to perform a consistency check on the chat views without revealing any chat content or sender identities. Last but not least, computing the digest over the ciphertext instead of the plaintext provides robustness to failure and resilience to attacks on setup and key update.
Upon receiving a message, Uj matches {zi, Xi|i = 1, . . . , clen} to his zj and Rj , and records U l if z jl , R jl ∈ {zi, Xi|i = 1, . . . , clen}. If he finds at least one matching (z jl , R jl ), he is able to compute the key and regards the matching U l ('s) as the message sender(s). (Because insiders may collude and share secrets, it is possible to identify more than one potential sender.) He then checks the message integrity and decrypts m and the digest. Uj will confirm the sender identity at the next consistency check with U l over the pairwise secure channel. If m is not from U l , U l creates a consistency check failure to indicate that m is forged.
EVALUATION OF GOTR

Security Analysis
The high-level security goal of GOTR is to realize a "private chatroom" over a public network. This includes several conventional goals against outsiders such as confidentiality, integrity, robustness and loose synchrony; for space concerns we do not further consider these goals here. Instead we focus on the ways in which GOTR differs from prior work on OTR in a group setting: repudiability and authentication. Throughout our analysis, we consider a group of N parties that can communicate pairwise over an insecure network. We assume a method for pairwise authenticated key establishment, access to an anonymizing network, and allow concurrent protocol executions, each identified by a common (public) session identifier. We distinguish between a "chat transcript" that lists for each party in a session, the input messages delivered to the sendMsg subroutine and times; and a "protocol transcript" that includes all messages exchanged by the GOTR protocol.
Offline Repudiability. Briefly, we define strong offline repudiability in terms of an adversary, who controls N −1 parties and produces a pair of chat transcripts τ, τ ′ that differ in a single message; a single honest party that faithfully executes the GOTR protocol with the adversarial parties given a chat transcript τ ; a simulator that takes as input a pair of chat transcripts τ, τ ′ , a protocol transcript T corresponding to τ , and the private inputs s of the adversary, and produces a protocol transcript T ′ corresponding to τ ′ ; and a judge that takes as input a chat transcript τ * , protocol transcript T * , and private inputs s of the adversary, and outputs a singlebit guess. A group messaging protocol has strong offline repudiability if for every adversary and judge, there exists a simulator such that the judge cannot distinguish between the case that (T * , τ * , s) result from the interaction of the adversary and the honest party on transcript τ and the case that (T * , τ * , s) result from the output of the simulator on input (T ′ , τ ′ , τ, s). Informally, the transcript may bind users to the conversation, but every single message in the conversation is repudiable after the fact.
We sketch the simulator S needed for our proof that GOTR provides strong offline repudiability. The simulator need not change anything in the transcript T up to the point at which τ and τ ′ differ. In the round in which they are different, S uses the private inputs of the adversarial parties along with the circle key broadcast of the honest user to derive the circle key and produce an appropriate encryption of the message in τ ′ . For all following rounds, S uses the symmetric keys shared by the adversarial parties with the honest user to simulate the honest user's inputs following τ ′ and runs the adversary code to produce the adversarial portion of the transcript T ′ . Note that since T and T ′ use the same secret keys, the output T ′ is identically distributed to an interaction between the adversary and the honest user with transcript τ ′ .
Online repudiability. We define online repudiability in terms of a judge that controls N − 2 parties, honest parties H1 and H2 that faithfully execute the GOTR protocol given an adversarially chosen chat transcript τ , and an environment that controls two players, including the loss of network inputs to and from those players, and takes a chat transcript τ and adversarially chosen round r as input. We say that a protocol has online repudiability if for every judge there exists an environment so that the judge cannot distinguish between interacting with H1 and H2 on input τ and the environment on input τ ; and the environment never produces a message from H1 in round r. Informally, for every message sent by H1 there must exist a plausible alternative scenario in which H1 does not send the message, either via collusion with H2 or as a result of network conditions. Note that this possibilistic notion of security against a stronger adversary is incomparable to offline repudiability: a protocol may be secure against either notion, both, or neither. Informally, the environment Z required to show that GOTR has online repudiability works as follows. In rounds prior to r, Z executes H1 and H2 faithfully according to the transcript τ . At round r, Z uses the circle key computed by H1 to send protocol messages via H2 that decrypt to H1's message in chat transcript τ . In subsequent rounds, Z simulates a complete outbound network failure for H1, and uses the pairwise symmetric keys negotiated by H1 with all judgecontrolled parties to send key update messages and protocol messages via H2, according to the chat transcript τ . Since Z knows all secrets associated to both parties, protocol messages sent to the judge will continue to have the same probability distribution as if H1 and H2 interact honestly. We note that this proof can be extended to the case that H1 does not faithfully execute the protocol, for example by causing an unexpected consistency check failure or leaving a chat before the end of the transcript τ ; these actions may be plausibly explained by network failures caused by Z.
Authentication. We define authenticated group messaging in terms of an adversary that controls N − 2 parties and two honest parties H1 and H2. The adversary may run any number of concurrent sessions with H1 and H2, and request H1 and H2 to send any chat messages in those sessions, before sending a chat message m * to H1 in a target session s * . The adversary wins if H1 accepts m * with source H2, and m * was never sent by H2 in s * . A group messaging protocol is authenticated if no efficient adversary can win this game.
To see that GOTR is authenticated, we consider the conditions required to accept m * from H2: (i) the circle key applied to m * must include a z value sent by H1 to H2; (ii) the protocol message Mac must verify; and (iii) H1 must receive a consistency check message from H2 that includes m * in the digest. We note that the security of the BD GKA prevents an adversary from deriving the circle key if a previous z value sent by H1 is replayed in a different BD GKA message. Furthermore, the security of the Mac prevents the adversary from constructing a correct tag from an unknown key. Finally, if a message is encrypted using H2's circle key and H2 did not send the message, honest H2 will never include m * in the digest of a consistency check; forgery of such a message is impossible due to the security of the Mac used in pairwise communications and the security of the pairwise authenticated key agreement scheme. Boxes indicate 1st and third quartiles, bands inside the box indicate medians, crosses and circles indicate outliers.
Complexity
Leveraging the BD GKA, our scheme requires four rounds of contributory data exchange during a key update, plus two more rounds to verify the data using the flake key.
The number of messages to exchange the contributory data for each user is O(N ). The message transmitted in the communication stage is of size O(N ) since all the contributory data is piggybacked with the message. To add a member to the group chat, each user only needs to add one flake into her circle, i.e. 3 more messages to send and receive per key update. To remove a member, each user removes one flake, i.e. no messages are transmitted. If the group only has two users, the flake is the circle, and our scheme operates in a way very similar to two-party OTR. To measure the performance of our protocol in a more realistic environment, we implement GOTR as a Pidgin plugin, and run chats of 4, 8, 12 , and 16 XMPP clients using a public server jabber.org. We use the 2048-bit MODP group as specified in RFC 3526 [12] to measure the execution time of the plugin on Intel Core i5-2500K computers running Linux. Measurement shows that the execution time is mostly due to the transmission delay from one Jabber client to another. The boxplots with whiskers with maximum 1.5 IQR of the data are shown in Figure 2 
CONCLUSION
We proposed a group OTR protocol GOTR that provides unconditional repudiability, in the sense that we allow users to repudiate the authorship of session messages in the presence of a computationally unbounded online judge, with the assistance of a subset of insiders, while forgery by malicious insiders can still be detected. The repudiability of our scheme does not rely on the deniability of the entity authentication algorithm, and therefore circumvents the problems in real-world plausible deniability. GOTR utilizes a feature of certain GKAs, such as Burmester-Desmedt, to turn it into a robust "hotplug" GKA, and to further turn the adverse facts that the network may fail and users may be faulty into the security of the senders. We have implemented the core protocol as a Pidgin plugin.
